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Shifting Borders: Africa's Displacement Crisis and Its Security Implications

by Wendy Williams



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Shifting Borders: Africa's Displacement Crisis and Its Security Implications

by Wendy Williams

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
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A SURGE OF FORCIBLY DISPLACED

Images of desperate refugees and migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean from Africa to Europe have come to define the “African migration crisis.” Indeed, attempted crossings have swelled with 86,000 African migrants entering Europe without a visa annually on average since 2014.

African migration to Europe, however, is taking place within a larger phenomenon of forced displacement. More than 1.6 million Africans have been forcibly displaced each year on average since 2014. The record 25 million African refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and asylum seekers documented in 2018 represents an almost five-fold increase since 2005 when just 5 million Africans were displaced (see Figure 1). Moreover, it is not widely recognized that over 95 percent of forcibly displaced Africans remain in Africa. Two-thirds of this total, almost 17 million people, remain within their own countries. Africa’s “migration crisis,” therefore, is more accurately a “displaced persons crisis.” Migration to Europe, in other words, is just the tip of Africa’s population displacement iceberg.




Data sources: UNHCR, IDMC

The multifaceted nature of this crisis defies a single overarching explanation. While often conflated, economic migrants and forcibly displaced persons are responding to different push-pull factors leading to their dislocation. The economic migrants trying to reach Europe are generally searching for employment and a higher standard of living. These individuals largely hail from West and North Africa, are of working age, single, and start with some resources. Others, mostly from the Horn of Africa, aim for the Gulf States. An even larger cohort of economic migrants, however, stay in Africa. Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and South Africa are leading destinations for Africa's economic migrants given the relative availability of employment opportunities.

Africa's forced displacement crisis, meanwhile, is part of a trend that has accelerated since 2005 (see Figure 1). Roughly 84 percent of the 25 million forcibly displaced on the continent come from 8 conflict-affected countries: South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Cameroon. These conflicts comprise a combination of new and ongoing conflicts. As these conflicts have festered, they have dislocated an ever larger number of people. The number of conflict IDPs in Africa, for example, has escalated by 135 percent since 2011. These individuals have typically been compelled to flee their homes, usually at short notice. The forcibly displaced are often comprised of households with very limited means and suddenly disconnected from their livelihoods.

These near-term drivers of the displacement crisis are compounded by structural factors. Africa's population is set to double from today's 1.1 billion to over 2 billion by 2050 (see Figure 2). Some 60 percent of Africa's population today is under 25 years of age, meaning this population growth will continue for the foreseeable future. Environmental pressures—drought, floods, and declining soil fertility—caused by changing global climate

Figure 2. Population Estimates and Projections by Region, 1950-2100

Data source: UNDESA¹

patterns and land pressures, are further long-term amplifiers of population dislocation.

Africa's displacement crisis has a spectrum of security implications. Most vivid are the serious humanitarian consequences. Displaced populations are subject to higher levels of morbidity, mortality, and malnutrition than stable populations. In fact, mortality rates among displaced populations during the acute phase of displacement are up to 60 times the average levels of mortality.² The major causes of death include preventable waterborne diseases, communicable diseases, respiratory tract infections, and malaria. Those living in displacement camps are also notoriously vulnerable to exploitation and abuse by those managing the camps or local communities. As the scale of Africa's displacement crisis increases, the human costs also grow more profound.

Economic migrants who attempt to transit the Sahel-Saharan belt to the Mediterranean or from the Horn to the Gulf States or South Africa face other security threats. Unable to access safe, legal channels

of travel, they are forced to take “irregular” paths that do not afford protection and cost up to \$5,000 per person. This demand for alternate means of passage has created a lucrative market in human smuggling in Africa loosely estimated at between \$550 million and \$1 billion.

Human smuggling is causing a transfer of resources from vulnerable individuals to transnational criminal networks, militias, militant organizations, and terrorist groups.

In addition to individual entrepreneurs capitalizing on an opportunity to earn a living, a variety of transnational criminal networks emerged or adapted to fill this illicit market demand. Terrorist groups, including those linked to African affiliates of al Qaeda and the Islamic State as well as a variety of lesser known groups, have also been drawn to this revenue source. Meanwhile, facilitators spanning western and eastern Africa use incentives, recruitment, and coercion to drum up more “customers.” In effect, human smuggling is causing a transfer of resources from vulnerable individuals to transnational criminal networks, militias, militant organizations, and terrorist groups, all of which are focused on undermining governments on the continent. The regional and transnational implications from this, in turn, create further instability in the international system.

There is also the inherent instability created when large numbers of a population are uprooted and with them their existing social, governance, or economic structures. When local merchants and traders are displaced, for example, this severs the ties that connect these communities with markets, further accelerating economic decline and inhibiting recovery. After conflict, investment tends to dry up for years and sometimes decades. By some estimates, almost 2 percent of Africa’s population has been displaced in recent years.

The lost human and economic potential is staggering. Estimates suggest that 20 percent of children in countries affected by conflict do not attend primary school—more than double the 8.9 percent global average.³ This risks perpetuating the human costs and security implications of displacement for a generation.

The economic, environmental, and social strains placed on host communities by a large influx of displaced persons simultaneously creates enormous pressure on governments and entire regions to cope. Northern Uganda, for example, has absorbed some 726,000 South Sudanese refugees—this in a region with a regular population of almost 1.9 million people. As the South Sudan crisis endures, the potential destabilizing effects on northern Uganda, a region with its own legacy of instability, will surely escalate. Similar patterns can be seen as a result of political crises in Burundi, the DRC, and Somalia, among others.

In sum, the surge in African displacement and irregular migration is multilayered and incurs significant human and security costs. Left unaddressed, the upward trend is not likely to end any time soon. Treating the symptoms of the crisis (funding refugee camps, securitizing border crossings, restricting policies for refugees, or increased security patrols on the Mediterranean) will not mitigate the causes behind this phenomenon. If the African displacement crisis is to be reversed, it will be necessary to tackle the drivers of the displacement in the first place.

DRIVERS OF DISPLACEMENT IN AFRICA

The surge in displacement seen in Africa since the mid-2010s is a function of near-term and structural factors that are exerting multiple points of pressure on African households precipitating the decisions to uproot their lives and leave their homes.

Near-Term Drivers


Unresolved conflict perpetuates displacement

There are 13 African countries facing major armed conflict, and they account for almost 90 percent of the 25 million people displaced by conflict and persecution on the continent. In recent years, Africa has hosted more than a third of the world's conflicts and around 35 percent of all persons displaced as a result. This displacement figure represents both the accumulated effect of long, drawn-out conflicts as well as the sudden surge of displacement seen in new crises. In some cases, it is a combination of the two (see text box on page 9). Rather than dissipating over time, long unresolved conflicts produce repeated waves of displacement.

The upward trend in forced displacement since 2005 can be largely attributed to such protracted conflicts whose effects bleed into the surrounding region. Notably, there are regional concentrations of conflict (and displacement) in the Great Lakes, the Sudans, Somalia,

¹ The available data collected on all refugees, asylum seekers, conflict IDPs, and non-forcibly displaced migrants used in this report come from the United Nation's High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the Mixed Migration Centre (formerly the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS)), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs' (UNDESA) Population Division.

While there were more than 25 million forcibly displaced Africans identified using these sources, given the disparate and often irregular nature of these dislocations—not to mention the omission, for purposes of this report, of the average 2 million displaced by natural disasters annually—the figures are likely much higher. Likewise, calculating an accurate number of economic migrants from or in any country—especially on the African continent—is tenuous. For example, UNDESA, which relies on national statistics, found that 17 percent of African countries did not have any data on international migrant levels since 2000. Nevertheless, because these are the best sources available, the author relies on these data for observing trends.

Figure 3. Displacement and Autocracy in African Countries Experiencing Major Conflict

Note: The displacement in Somalia, Niger, Nigeria, and Mali is largely caused by militant Islamist insurgencies. While Ethiopia and Somalia have taken steps toward democracy, legacy issues from years of repressive rule have contributed to forced displacement numbers today.


Color legend source: Joseph Siegle, Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Based on trichotomized categorization of data of Polity IV's democracy score and Freedom House's political rights and civil liberties ratings.

Data sources: UNHCR, IDMC

and the Lake Chad Basin. The contiguous pattern of conflict in Africa (see Figure 3), moreover, means that the prospects of finding refuge in neighboring countries is often unlikely.

Many who have fled the sectarian violence in CAR, for example, shelter in the DRC. At the same time, more than 15,000 Congolese have been displaced to war-torn South Sudan, which is hosting Sudanese nationals fleeing conflicts in the South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions. Meanwhile, South Sudanese have fled in all directions, including into Sudan, Uganda, the DRC, and CAR (see Figure 4).

So long as these conflicts persist and go unresolved, so too will the displaced persons crisis. While some may find opportunities to resettle in other countries, most will not, leading to a perpetual source of tension in the affected region.



Data source: UNHCR

Sudan: Half a Century of Dysfunction and Displacement

Sudan has experienced more than 50 years of political crisis punctuated by four large-scale conflicts. From independence in 1955 until 1972, the country faced civil conflict between north and south over issues of geographic, religious, and ethnic exclusion. After a 10-year interlude, fighting resumed, lasting from 1983–2005. In 2003, rebel groups in the Darfur region of western Sudan rose up against the government for oppressing the region's non-Arab population. In response, the government carried out a campaign of ethnic cleansing that killed and displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians. Despite the negotiation of several peace agreements, the conflict did not end. When South Sudan gained its independence in 2011, the South Kordofan and Blue Nile States erupted in violence as populations in these regions had also wanted but were denied independence. This uprising became entwined with the Darfur conflict as the insurgents formed a loose alliance against the government.

Despite the forging of a power-sharing agreement that brought civilians into the government in 2019 after decades of military rule, there are still some 2.8 million forcibly displaced Sudanese. This number does not include the millions more Sudanese who had fled the country during the first and second civil wars to countries like Egypt where they permanently resettled. Similar patterns can be seen in Burundi, the DRC, Somalia, and South Sudan, among others. However, as these numbers swell, the prospects of newly displaced households finding a durable solution nearby—as millions of Sudanese did in Egypt from the 1970s to the 1990s—are increasingly dim.

Repressive governance

How governments respond to citizens' priorities and grievances is at the heart of much of the displacement on the continent. All 13 of Africa's major armed conflicts are internal (rather than interstate). This underscores the critical relationship between exclusive governance, political crisis, and conflict. Governments that are more legitimate, participatory, and respectful of the rule of law tend to do a better job of mitigating such internal conflicts.

Of the 10 African countries with the greatest number of people displaced by conflict and persecution, 9 have authoritarian-leaning

Table 1. Forced Displacement Linked to Autocracy			
Country of Origin	Political Regime*	Term Limits Upheld?	Total Forcibly Displaced
South Sudan	Autocracy	No	4,151,728
DRC	Autocracy	No	3,937,043
Somalia	Semi-Authoritarian	No	3,514,080
Sudan	Autocracy	No	2,864,228
Ethiopia	Semi-Authoritarian	No	2,362,517
Nigeria	Democratizer	Yes	2,272,661
CAR	Semi-Authoritarian	No	1,235,373
Cameroon	Autocracy	No	847,196
Eritrea	Autocracy	No	585,874
Burundi	Autocracy	No	429,261
Total			22,199,961

Note: The displacement in Somalia and Nigeria is largely caused by militant Islamist insurgencies.

* Source: Joseph Siegle, Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Based on trichotomized categorization of data of Polity IV's democracy score and Freedom House's political rights and civil liberties ratings.

Data sources: UNCHR, IDMC

governments (see Table 1). Leaders in all nine of these governments have avoided term limits by either changing their constitutions or otherwise not adhering to these limits, allowing them to remain in power. The average tenure of African leaders without term limits is 18 years. This compares to just 4 years for countries with term limits.⁴ Countries lacking term limits in Africa also tend to be more unstable with a third of these countries experiencing major conflict. A restrictive political environment is thus both a direct driver of forced displacement as well an indirect driver through the conflict that results.

Eritrea provides a good example of the direct links between authoritarian governance and displacement. Its citizens have long fled the brutal conditions in the country—the number of Eritreans

who have crossed the Mediterranean to Europe since 2009 is upwards of 120,000 (out of a population of 6 million). The number of Eritreans in neighboring countries is even higher—the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) calculated almost 175,000 in Ethiopia alone. Since 1995, the government has enforced a mandatory national service conscription that effectively forces Eritrean citizens into indentured servitude, performing work for the government for an indeterminate period of time (though officially this is limited to 18 months). There is no free press or political sphere for citizens to voice grievances. A 2016 UN Commission of Inquiry report linked the mass displacement of Eritreans to the country's "gross human rights violations."⁵ The brief reopening of the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2018-2019 generated a renewed surge in Eritreans seeking refuge in Ethiopia.

Corruption is a particularly pernicious element of poor governance that contributes to displacement. Research has shown there is a "tipping point" where once a threshold of institutional corruption is reached, for every slight increase in perceived corruption, a large decrease in domestic security follows.⁶ Corruption in the police and judiciary are particularly important. Once its citizens believe the police or legal system can no longer be relied upon for protection, a country becomes much more vulnerable to instability.

One ramification of a lack of trust in government security services is the emergence of non-statutory security actors. While some are well-intentioned, others lack training or accountability structures. Such groups therefore often devolve into extortion rackets that vie to control revenue-generating sectors of a local economy.⁷ The result is greater instability and displacement.

Perceptions of government corruption also make it easier for violent extremist groups to recruit and retain members, further contributing to instability and displacement.⁸ Even though the


extremist groups themselves profit off of the corruption to channel funds and smuggle contraband and people, they justify their actions as proof of the state's unfitness for governance. Not only does the state further lose credibility with its disillusioned citizens, its institutions are also dramatically weakened by the corruption, rendering the state an unattractive alternative to extremist groups. A country like Mali is a good example of how corruption undermined the legitimate authority of the government in communities that saw little attention from Bamako. As aptly noted by counterterrorism experts, "[c]orruption is the most powerful weapon in the armoury of violent extremism."⁹

Economic factors

While the majority of dislocated Africans are forcibly displaced, economic factors are a key contributor to the flow of Africans trying to enter Europe, the Arabian Peninsula, and South Africa (see text box on page 14). This has created highly potent political dynamics in these countries of destination. Yet, it is important to recognize that the majority of Africa's economic migrants stay in Africa. An estimated 12.1 million economic African migrants live in a non-native African country. This number does not include the numerous African migrants who relocate to neighboring countries for seasonal or other short-term labor (otherwise known as circular migration). In total, roughly 80 percent of Africa's economic migrants stay in Africa.

Interviews of individuals in transit along Africa's migratory routes show that economic migrants, by and large, come from countries that are not uniformly the poorest of the poor nor embroiled in intense, countrywide conflict (see Figure 5). Rather, they are often responding to a combination of socioeconomic deprivations at home, a lack of governmental services for citizens, and perceived greater employment opportunities abroad.

Figure 5. Overlapping Drivers of Migration Along African Routes



Source: Mixed Migration Centre¹⁰

Many young Africans make the decision to leave because they do not see a viable future for themselves in their home countries. The existence of transnational family and community-support networks abroad can make the decision to emigrate, and to emigrate further afield, easier. Nonetheless, many economic migrants embark on their trek even without such family ties.

Along the Mediterranean routes, many have been willing to spend months to years working on a “pay as you go” system toward their destination.¹¹ There is also anecdotal evidence that, as word spreads about the dangers of robbery and extortion, many still choose to go but leave their money at home, saving it to be transferred through informal financial networks at different points along the journey or in cases of emergency.¹² For many African migrants then, even the knowledge that the journey will be dangerous has not been a deterrent.

Major Routes Taken by African Economic Migrants

The Mediterranean Routes

Of the estimated 86,000 African migrants who have arrived annually in Europe since 2014, the majority have hailed from Eritrea, southern Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Morocco, and Mali (see Figure 6). This pales in comparison to the estimated 1.5-2.5 million African migrants living along the North African countries of the Mediterranean. This population includes long-term and circular migrants who mostly come from other North African countries as well as from neighboring countries like Niger, Chad, and Sudan for work.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that Libya hosts the largest contingent of African economic migrants with at least 666,000 people. Between 250,000 and 350,000 are estimated to be in Algeria—mostly from Guinea, Mali, Niger, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso.¹³ While many may be transiting, Algeria has been a destination country in its own right since 2008, given the relative availability of employment opportunities in this hydrocarbon-rich country.

Egypt and Morocco are often considered origin countries. Morocco has a diaspora of more than 4 million, of which some 2.9 million are first-generation. Egypt's diaspora is even bigger: more than 8 million, of which some 3.4 million are first

generation. However, both countries have also become major stopping points for economic migrants. Egypt has a large informal economy and immigrant community, which many Africans seek out—whether they be long-term or merely transiting. The number of migrants in Egypt has increased since the government announced a crackdown on human smuggling in 2016. Since then, boat launchings from Egyptian shores have virtually disappeared.

In the last 5 years, more than 26,000 Moroccans have been intercepted crossing into Europe, putting it in the top five African nationalities attempting entry to Europe from the continent. However, the country has also become a destination country, hosting an estimated 55,000-85,000 migrants, the bulk being sub-Saharan, who may have intended but have been unable to cross into Spain.

The Arabian Peninsula Route

The Arabian Peninsula route tends to be used mostly by economic migrants from the Horn and East Africa (see Figure 6). IOM estimates about 160,000 migrants crossed the Arabian and Red Seas to the southern shore of war-torn Yemen in 2018.¹⁴ More than 90 percent of these migrants were identified as Ethiopian. This number reflects an upward trend since 2013, despite increased instability in Yemen.

The Southern African Route

The number of people migrating along the route toward South Africa every year is believed to be around 47,500, representing the full spectrum of seasonal to long-term migrants.¹⁵ The majority of these migrants are also from Ethiopia. Those that reach South Africa join the estimated 1-3 million long-term migrants already in the country, the majority of which are from neighboring countries, particularly Zimbabwe and Mozambique.¹⁶

Along the southern Africa route, the migrants have tended to rely on smugglers for help due to the potential complications they face if intercepted by police in transit countries. Under Kenya's Citizenship and Immigration Act of 2011, for example, being unlawfully present in the country is considered a criminal offense, the penalty for which may involve a fine of up to KES 5,000 (roughly \$50) or imprisonment for up to 3 years, or both.¹⁷ Even though the mainly Ethiopian migrants do not require a visa to enter Kenya, many do not have documentation proving their nationality. For that, and for help to pass through Tanzania onward, migrants from the Horn report employing smugglers. Investigations have found that the human-smuggling market in East Africa "runs primarily out of Nairobi and uses a chain of mukalas (human smugglers) to get migrants through the many jurisdictions on their journey."¹⁸

The route can be just as dangerous and fatal as those toward Europe. While aware of the risks of the journey, many young migrants, their families, and communities, remain undeterred and optimistic that they will be successful.¹⁹

Structural Drivers

In Africa, demographic and environmental changes are also relentlessly compounding the drivers of displacement on the continent.

Growing populations are adding pressure on Africa's youth to migrate

Sub-Saharan Africa's population has more than doubled since 1984, from 537 million to almost 1.3 billion. Projections are that it will double again (to over 2.5 billion) by 2050. Africa's population is also young. Sixty percent of Africa's population in 2017 was under 25 years of age (41 percent under 15), making it younger than any other region in the world. Africa's high fertility rates (on average, 4.9 children per woman in sub-Saharan Africa) are predicted to drop over the next century. But the fact that so much of the population has yet to reach adulthood means that it will be decades before African countries see a leveling off in population growth. This will have direct implications on population displacements in Africa.

Half of the 10 African nations expected to have the largest populations in 2050 are among the UN's list of least developed countries.

Some of the African countries expected to grow the most in the next 30 years already have significant forcibly displaced populations. The six African countries with the largest forced displacement (South Sudan, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Nigeria), accounting for more than 19 of the 25 million forcibly displaced people today, are expected to collectively more than double their populations by 2050 (see Table 2).

Table 2. Ten African Countries with the Largest Forced Displacement Are Also Some of the Fastest Growing				
Country of Origin	Total Forcibly Displaced	Population	Growth Rate (%)	Estimated 2050 Population
South Sudan	4,151,728	12,919,053	96	25,366,221
DRC	3,937,043	84,004,989	135	197,404,202
Somalia	3,514,080	15,181,925	136	35,851,792
Sudan	2,864,228	41,511,526	94	80,385,607
Ethiopia	2,362,517	107,534,882	77	190,869,632
Nigeria	2,272,661	195,875,237	110	410,637,868
CAR	1,235,373	4,737,423	87	8,850,780
Cameroon	847,196	24,678,234	102	49,817,390
Eritrea	585,874	5,187,948	85	9,606,664
Burundi	429,261	11,216,450	130	25,762,044

Data sources: UNHCR, IDMC, UNDESA

The Sahel, one of the poorest and most environmentally fragile regions, is also the region with the highest birthrates in Africa. Projections of a 120-percent increase in population in this region by 2050 is 20 percent higher than that of the continent as a whole (see Table 3). Three Sahelian countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger) are facing rapidly growing displacement due to Islamist insurgencies. These pressures risk accelerating instability and the incentives of those looking for long-term solutions to migrate out of this region and possibly further afield.

Half of the 10 African nations expected to have the largest populations in 2050 are among the UN’s list of least developed countries (LDCs): Angola, the DRC, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Tanzania (see Table 4). Rapid population growth in these countries will amplify the challenges citizens in these societies face in accessing basic needs of food, shelter, health care, and education. This is likely to cause more to seek livelihoods elsewhere.

Table 3. Expected 2050 Populations of Countries in the Sahel

Country of Origin	Total Forcibly Displaced	Migrants Living Abroad (≥1-Yr)	Population	Estimated 2050 Population	Growth Rate (%)
Niger	179,396	362,955	22,311,375	68,453,727	207
Mali	269,349	1,066,120	19,107,706	44,020,171	130
Chad	189,663	246,960	15,353,184	33,635,795	119
Burkina Faso	212,870	1,472,712	19,751,651	43,207,053	119
Senegal	53,660	559,952	16,294,270	34,030,620	109
Mauritania	45,195	120,433	4,540,068	8,965,000	97
Sudan	2,864,228	1,951,705	41,511,526	80,385,607	94
Eritrea	585,874	607,917	5,187,948	9,606,664	85

Data sources: UNHCR, IDMC, UNDESA

Environmental pressures are further accelerating displacement

LDCs are particularly vulnerable to environmental shocks. From slow-onset changes—such as rises in global temperatures and sea levels—to sudden-onset disasters—such as flooding and landslides—climate change wreaks havoc on many African countries, displacing thousands every year.

Some of these natural disasters are expected to get worse and last longer. Weather extremes will not just repeatedly displace people in flood zones, but rising ocean levels will also make parts of the coast lines—where some of Africa's largest cities are located—permanently uninhabitable. Rising temperatures and longer droughts will affect not just water availability but also individual livelihoods and national economies.

The World Bank predicts that, without concrete climate and development action, by 2050 more than 85 million sub-Saharan Africans could be forced to leave their own homes to escape these impacts.²³

Table 4. Ten African Countries Expected to Have the Largest Populations in 2050

Country of Origin	Population	Growth Rate (%)	Estimated 2050 Population
Nigeria	195,875,237	110	410,637,868
DRC*	84,004,989	135	197,404,202
Ethiopia*	107,534,882	77	190,869,632
Egypt	99,375,741	54	153,433,492
Tanzania*	59,091,392	134	138,081,621
Uganda	44,270,563	139	105,698,201
Kenya	50,950,879	87	95,467,137
Sudan*	41,511,526	94	80,385,607
Angola*	30,774,205	147	76,046,053
South Africa	57,398,421	27	72,754,583

* Classified by the UN as a least developed country (LDC)

Data source: UNDESA

The effects on climate-sensitive activities like agriculture and fishing will translate into substantial losses in food production. Food insecurity related to degraded land for agriculture, shrinking pasture for livestock, and diminishing reserves of water, firewood, and other natural resources, will further contribute to displacement and permanent resettlement.

Because of their reliance on rainfall for almost all crop production, many African countries are particularly vulnerable to climatic changes. Ethiopia's coffee industry, for example, contributes to a quarter of the country's total export earnings. Coffee can only grow in specific agro-ecological zones. However, between 40 and 60 percent of these zones are at risk of becoming unsuitable due to expected climatic shifts.²⁴ Cocoa plantations in West Africa are under similar threat.²⁵

Sudan's agribusiness employs up to 80 percent of Sudan's labor force.²⁶ It is expected that Sudan will see a rise in temperature of

1.3-3 degrees Celsius by the 2040s. All three of the World Food Programme's most likely climate scenarios find that any increase in temperature will negatively impact Sudan's agricultural output if adaptation measures are not implemented.²⁷

Climatic shifts and shocks can also act as a "threat multiplier" in conflict-prone regions, adding to the overlapping factors that drive conflict and displacement.²⁸ This is especially pronounced in countries with large pastoralist populations such as Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. As environmental stresses heighten land pressures, such migratory populations increasingly experience confrontations with sedentary populations along the way.


SECURITY THREATS RELATED TO POPULATION MOVEMENT IN AFRICA

The population movement caused by political and structural drivers creates a spectrum of security implications ranging from the immediate humanitarian costs and empowerment of militant groups to the long-term socioeconomic consequences for the millions of affected households and the regions attempting to absorb those displaced.

The Bolstering of Criminal Networks

People traveling without proper documentation understand the threat of being deported by the authorities and therefore are less likely to seek assistance when in trouble. This opens the door to abuse—be it in the form of corrupt authorities demanding a bribe under threat of arrest or duplicitous human smugglers. Many of the passages that go through the Maghreb-Sahel region, for example, are pre-existing smuggling routes for arms and contraband—popular, precisely because they have little effective state oversight.

Figure 7. Trans-Sahara Smuggling and Trafficking Routes and Militant-Controlled Areas



Source: RHIPTO/Riccardo Pravettoni²⁹

Having so much money floating along these routes attracts not just criminal elements but those who rely on the threat of violence to take control of a particular route, trade, or local community (see Figure 7). This has direct consequences for security in the affected country and region.

While the amount of illicit income generated from migration to Europe is inherently difficult to determine, estimates are that human smuggling along the Trans-Sahara route including Libya, alone, is worth up to \$765 million annually.³⁰

A significant share of these resources is making its way into the hands of criminals, insurgents, and violent extremist groups who operate in a region that includes Algeria, Libya, Chad, Sudan,

Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. For example, the resources of persons travelling irregularly to the Libyan coast are enriching the many Libyan tribal militias and local officials who have been implicated in the warehousing and exploitation of migrants for labor. The annual revenue from the Libyan migrant market to all armed groups between 2016 and 2018 was estimated at between \$93 million to \$244 million.³¹ One Libyan militia commander sanctioned by the United Nations was the leader of a transnational trafficking network working directly with terror groups, including a longstanding relationship with the Islamic State (ISIS). ISIS, in turn, has a well-documented record of human smuggling and trafficking, abuse, exploitation, and murder of sub-Saharan Africans in Libya.³²

While some Sahelian governments may see smuggling as a way of life and not a threat to the state, the inconsistent state security presence along these routes allows militant groups to become entrenched. Once in control of a smuggling route, militant groups can leverage their presence to extort money from all commercial traffic as well as impose protection taxes. Some estimates suggest that terrorist groups like the al Qaeda-affiliated coalition Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) could be drawing between \$22 million and \$38 million per year from taxation in the Sahel.³³ This security risk has a major impact on all other economic activity, investment, and employment in the region. Moreover, as JNIM and other extremist groups have grown stronger in Mali, their attacks on the government (as well as regional security partners) have escalated, posing a direct threat to the state.

Similarly, as the market for human smuggling has expanded, more criminal actors have become involved, and some have been incorporated into international networks. The growing phenomenon of smuggling networks emanating from Libya have also contributed to instability and insecurity across the Maghreb and Sahel. Moreover, the phenomenon has taken on a life of its own with human smugglers actively recruiting more migrants. These

actors are dipping ever further into sub-Saharan countries soliciting, luring, and coercing potential travelers. The OECD reports a growth in North African smugglers—Egyptians, Moroccans, and Libyans. “These smugglers then recruit unemployed youth in Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana to serve as recruiters in local communities.”³⁴

While human smuggling is often depicted as providing migrants alternative paths of transit, human trafficking involves moving people against their will to then profit off of them either via labor or ransom. As one analyst succinctly put it, “In the case of human trafficking, the commodity is the control over a person for the purpose of exploitation. In the case of human smuggling, the commodity is the illegal entry into one or more countries.”³⁵ Increasingly, human smuggling to the Libyan coast has crossed the line into human trafficking as it moves from transactional to exploitative.

*The criminal activity and corruption
associated with trafficking undermine
domestic stability and the
rule of law.*

For thousands of migrants heading for the Mediterranean this has meant being held by their smugglers for ransom, forced into debt bondage to pay off suddenly increased rates, or simply sold to traffickers for further exploitation. Human Rights Watch documented the kidnapping and torture of Eritreans in Sudan and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula by kidnappers who were able to coerce between \$20,000 to \$33,000 per victim from the Eritrean diaspora in Europe and the United States. Similar practices have been documented occurring in Libya and the Horn.³⁶

When people are trafficked, unlike people traveling of their own free will, they do not send remittances back to their home countries.

In effect, the victim's family, community, and country lose out on their earning potential. Further, the criminal activity and corruption associated with trafficking undermine domestic stability and the rule of law.

In weak states the smuggling of illicit goods and people and the armed groups perpetrating it also inhibit state building. As the East Africa regional bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, has noted, "[g]iven the scale of the human smuggling business in Libya, there can be little doubt that migrants and refugees have become a commodity fueling the war economy in the region and contributing to the centrifugal forces responsible for the enduring breakdown in law and order."³⁷ The United States Institute of Peace has similarly recognized the difficulty of getting rival actors to the negotiating table to consolidate governmental authority when "the very logic of trafficking and smuggling, which relies on tenuous controls of the state's periphery, is an incentive for armed groups to maintain a weak state rather than allow a strong one to be rebuilt."³⁸

The Human Costs of Displacement

Under threat from conflict, people flee with little to nothing of their possessions. Among the displaced are merchants and traders, their displacement severing the ties that connect these communities with regional markets, accelerating economic decline and inhibiting recovery. After conflict, investment tends to dry up for years and sometimes decades. A single year of civil war is estimated to reduce a country's economic growth by about 2 percent and its neighbors' by about 0.7 percent of their GDP.³⁹

The vast majority of people fleeing conflict, importantly, stay within their countries (IDPs). Of those who leave their country (refugees), most flee to the nearest accessible border and stop their flight there. In other words, their primary objective is to get

Table 5. African Countries Hosting the Largest Refugee Displacements				
Host Country	Refugee Population	African Origin of Population	Largest Refugee Camp/ Settlement	Year Established
Uganda	1,165,653	South Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, Sudan	Bidi Bidi	2016
Sudan	1,078,287	South Sudan, CAR	Shagarab	1985
Ethiopia	903,226	South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan	Gambella region	2009
DRC	529,061	CAR, South Sudan, Burundi	Lusenda	2015
Chad	451,210	Sudan, CAR	Dar Sila region	2003
Kenya	421,248	Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan	Dadaab complex	1991
Cameroon	380,329	CAR, Nigeria	Minawao	2013
South Sudan	291,842	Sudan, CAR	Yida	2012
Tanzania	278,322	Burundi	Nyarugusu	1996
Egypt	246,749	Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan	n/a	n/a
Niger	175,418	Nigeria	Intikane	2013
Rwanda	145,360	Burundi	Mahama	2015
Algeria	94,350	Western Sahara	Tindouf	1976

Data source: UNHCR

out of harm’s way. The implication is that forced displacement is a regional problem where border towns bear the bulk of the burden. IDPs, refugees, and hosting authorities often anticipate that the displacement will only be temporary. However, failing the timely resolution of the political crisis that has caused the displacement, IDP and refugee populations tend to persist. The average duration of exile for refugees globally today stands at 10.3 years.⁴⁰ For IDPs it can be as long as two decades.

Of the more than 7 million refugees on the continent, around 60 percent live in camps.⁴¹ Just a few countries—Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and the DRC—are hosting the lion's share of refugees (see Table 5). In 2017, Uganda became the largest host nation of refugees in Africa. The border towns of northern Uganda, a region with an estimated population of just 1.9 million, have absorbed some 726,000 South Sudanese refugees.

Hosting displaced populations (be they refugees or IDPs) for long periods of time is problematic for numerous reasons. Not only are a hosting community's resources severely strained, but the coping strategies of the displaced are likewise stretched thin if not broken. Once they have missed their harvests or planting seasons, the displaced are dependent on others for at least another year. The cycle spirals downward. Often, governments turn to humanitarian organizations to assist. But with many crises dragging on year after year, donor fatigue dries up resources and both the displaced and host governments face severe strains for years.

As the pressure on host communities builds, the potential destabilizing effects expand. For example, as the South Sudan crisis endures, the risks of instability in northern Uganda, a region with its own legacy of strife, will escalate. Similar patterns can be seen as a result of political crises in Burundi, CAR, the DRC, and Somalia.

Large settlements of people displaced within and across borders by protracted intrastate conflicts may also become targets or recruiting grounds for rebel groups, gangs, or other illicit actors. This is especially a risk when the displacement is perceived to have an intercommunal dimension, creating a defining identity within the victimized group and a lever for recruitment by sympathetic actors. To the extent that this displacement crosses borders, it may also draw in neighboring countries fueling extended regional instability, as arguably has been the case for years in the Great Lakes region.

CURRENT STRATEGIES ARE INSUFFICIENT

For many African governments of migrant origin countries, the outflow of mostly young and able-bodied men who comprise the majority of economic migrants may appear to provide a release valve for potential political crises due to unemployment, urban overcrowding, and other socioeconomic concerns. Plus, those migrants who successfully find employment in another country send money home. World Bank data reveal that migrant remittances can be an important part of a country's GDP.

However, as noted earlier, displacement contributes to a host of unforeseen security concerns, including for the country of origin. Moreover, certain countries are experiencing reoccurring waves of forced displacement due to ongoing conflict. In effect, those unresolved political crises are being externalized to their neighbors. These neighbors and international actors have used various methods to respond to the large influxes of vulnerable populations crossing their borders with mixed effect.

The African Union: A History of Good Intentions but Inconsistent Implementation

Since the wave of independence in the 1960s, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the AU, has envisaged the free movement of persons as essential to continental socioeconomic integration. However, the majority of AU member states have been slow to take concrete action to make such integration a reality.

In 1991, the OAU passed the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, commonly known as the Abuja Treaty, which set up the framework for a continent-wide economic community including the free movement of persons. In 2006, in recognition that “well-managed migration may have a substantial positive impact for

the development of countries of origin and yield significant benefits to destination States, [while] mismanaged or unmanaged migration can have serious negative consequences for States' and migrants' welfare, including potential destabilizing effect on national and regional security," the AU met in Banjul to adopt a policy on migration from which African countries could borrow, adapt, or use to inform their own national and regional migration priorities.⁴² The framework addressed a comprehensive range of migration issues in Africa: labor migration, irregular migration, forced displacement, internal migration, the collection of migration data, border management, migration and development, and interstate and interregional cooperation. Though comprehensive, the framework was nonbinding, and few governments used the elements within it as intended.

*Unresolved political crises are being
externalized to their neighbors.*

To their credit, the 15-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1979 and the 6-member East African Community (EAC) in 1999 established the right of their citizens to entry, residence, and establishment in any other country within their respective regions as long as they had documentation proving their nationality. Incidentally, the West African region hosts 44 percent of the estimated 12.1 million economic migrants on the continent.

In recent years, individual countries have gone even further to ease travel. In 2016, the Seychelles was the only visa-free country for all passport-holding Africans. Since then, nine other countries have allowed all passport-holding Africans either visa-free entry or visas on arrival. These efforts are in line with the AU's goal to roll out a passport for all African citizens in accordance with its Agenda 2063. Meanwhile, in 2014 Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya agreed to allow their citizens to travel freely across their shared borders using only a

national identity card—a measure that increased cross-border trade by 50 percent between these three countries.⁴³

In its 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the OAU encouraged its member states to assist and protect a broader definition of “refugee” than already existed in international law, one that was more reflective of the reality on the ground. The Convention was subsequently ratified by 46 member states. This was supplemented by the AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampala Convention) in 2009, which committed governments to protect the rights of and provide for the needs of all citizens (including host communities) affected by displacement due to conflict, natural disasters, or development projects. Signed by 40 member states and ratified by 27, the Convention went into force in 2012. Despite these two legal instruments, implementation of assistance to refugees and IDPs has been uneven at best.

Since 2006, Uganda has championed a model of allowing refugees the right of free movement, labor, and integration within host communities. This approach has slowly been gaining currency among other African countries. Unfortunately, the massive number of refugees, mostly from South Sudan, has made continued provision of benefits more difficult. Some towns in Uganda, such as the greater Adjumani area, are home to almost equal numbers of refugees as local residents.


At times, a country’s well-intentioned policy to provide protections for forcibly displaced persons has created loopholes for exploitation and corruption. South Africa, for example, has seen its asylum seeker management system overwhelmed by economic migrants. While South Africa allows asylum seekers to live and work anywhere in the country pending determination on their asylum claim, its laws make it difficult for other types of migrants to live and work in South Africa legally. Consequently, among legitimate

asylum seekers, there are others who have asked for asylum just to get the right to work during its processing.⁴⁴ This has done little to help the animosity and discrimination against foreigners, especially during economic downturns.

Despite 32 countries signing the Protocol on Free Movement as part of the African Continental Free Trade Area framework of 2018, the eventual free movement of African citizens throughout Africa, seems distant in practice. To reach this goal there would need to be crucial improvements in each country's population registration systems, shared border management, bilateral return agreements, and consistent law enforcement at the national level.⁴⁵ Moreover, destination countries like South Africa and those in North Africa where unemployment is high face backlash from citizens if borders are opened to economic migrants. Without a more specific roadmap to establishing the free movement of persons across the continent — one that addresses both the real and perceived obstacles — little practical progress can be expected. Thus far, only one country — Rwanda — has ratified the Protocol on Free Movement.

International Assistance: Short-Term Objectives Adding to Long-Term Challenges

The close proximity of Europe to Africa has facilitated a long shared history that has culminated in some 9 million Africans living in Europe today. This relationship has included various attempts to manage and mitigate irregular migration across the Mediterranean. In 2006, for example, the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (the Rabat Process) began as a means to stop irregular migration flows and develop institutional cooperation in managing migration from West Africa to Europe. In 2014, the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (the Khartoum Process) was launched with a similar goal between East African countries and the European



Source: European Council on Foreign Relations⁴⁶

Union. With the number of undocumented migrants from Africa continuing to rise, in 2015, the EU set up a €1.8 billion (\$1.93 billion) migration and development trust fund for programming designed to impact 23 countries comprising the Sahel, Lake Chad, Horn of Africa, and North Africa regions (see Figure 8).⁴⁷

Despite the comprehensive nature of several of these initiatives, many policy analysts and refugee and migrant activists have pointed out that the majority of EU resources go toward “border control, security, and measures to restrict migratory flows” rather than address root causes of migration.⁴⁸ Instead of stopping the flow, these policies have redirected it to less patrolled and more dangerous routes, raising the cost of smuggling and the risk to migrants. They have also contributed to the rise in the number of migrants trapped in horrific conditions in North African countries.

EU members moreover have been partnering with repressive regimes known for their poor human rights records, including Eritrea and Sudan. In other words, the very governments causing the largest displacement of people have been rewarded with legitimizing attention and assistance.

Sudan, which is responsible for the internal and international displacement of almost 3 million of its own people, was initially allocated €100 million (\$114.65 million) from the EU trust fund to support basic services (education and health), livelihoods and food security, civil society, local governance, and peacebuilding. Since then, Sudan has been allocated additional funding for programs to stem irregular migration of Africans across Sudan toward Europe.

In 2016, the main opposition leader in Sudan alleged that the EU funding was instead being used to arm the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group comprised of former Janjaweed militants who had carried out ethnic cleansing in Darfur.⁴⁹ Even though the EU issued a statement assuring that it was not funding the RSF, the RSF itself affirmed that it was involved in “fighting illegal migration” and that it had received new vehicles as a result.⁵⁰ In 2017, the Sudanese government made the RSF an official, but autonomous, part of the national military whose mandate includes border protection. In 2019, the RSF was responsible for the violent crackdown in Khartoum and other parts of Sudan on unarmed protesters demanding an end to military rule.

In the transit country of Libya, the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and Italy signed a bilateral agreement in 2017 for €200 million (\$215 million) intended to limit the number of people travelling from Libya to Italy. The EU acknowledged its support of the deal that included training and equipping the Libyan Coast Guard and funding existing detention centers affiliated with the GNA's Ministry of Interior as temporary migrant reception centers.⁵¹ This agreement followed a December 2016 report by the United

Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights that found migrants were subjected to arbitrary detention, torture, other ill-treatment, unlawful killings, and sexual violence in official and unofficial detention centers. Investigative reporting, furthermore, documented the Libyan Coast Guard not coming to the aid of drowning migrants in the Mediterranean but rather preventing other rescue boats from safely aiding the drowning migrants.⁵² The UN subsequently imposed sanctions against a Libyan commander of the Coast Guard based in Zawiya for his involvement in those activities.

In sum, many find that while the EU-supported approach to migration management in Africa may have reduced the flow of African migrants to Europe since 2017, it has done little to address the drivers of migration or alleviate the abuses suffered by African refugees and migrants seeking to come to Europe. This suggests that the reduction in migrant flows is likely temporary. Moreover, EU policies have arguably empowered and emboldened the actors committing the abuses contributing to at least 12,000 deaths and the forced return of an estimated 40,000 to their abusers.⁵³

Lessons From Previous Migration Crises

The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees

Set up in response to the wave of “boat people” fleeing communist Vietnam, the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees (CPA) was the first time the international community introduced the use of in-country applications for asylum.⁵⁴ This initiative was aimed at mitigating risks faced by asylum seekers vulnerable to criminal elements—not unlike what is happening on African migration routes now.

The international community convinced the Vietnamese government to permit in-country asylum screenings and the issuance of visas to those who qualified for asylum, allowing refugees to migrate through legal channels. Mass media broadcast the new procedures for in-country asylum applications along with a warning about the dangers would-be sea farers faced employing clandestine boat departures.

Despite shortcomings in its execution, the CPA allowed the international community to resettle Vietnamese refugees while also enabling more refugees to switch from the dangerous, clandestine routes to safe, legal migration channels.⁵⁵

MERCOSUR

Like the AU and its RECs, South American governments and regional organizations have long been contemplating better regional initiatives for freedom of movement of their citizens. One promising approach, in force since 2009, has been the MERCOSUR (the Southern Common Market) Residence Agreement.⁵⁶ The agreement allows citizens of the nine signatory states the right of residence and permission to work with proof of a valid passport, birth certificate, and police clearance. Among other benefits, member migrants are promised equal civil, social, cultural, and economic rights as citizens of the host country. Before the expiration of their 2-year temporary residence, they may also apply for permanent residence in the host country.

The agreement came about as a result of the member countries' desire to address irregular migration in a region that has a large informal economy.⁵⁷ Despite inconsistencies in the application of various aspects of the agreement within and across member states, the member countries appear to recognize the value of the mutual protection of their citizens.

Philippines

In another model, countries with longstanding migrant links have established intergovernmental agreements to allow for a regularized flow of migration between origin and destination countries to better protect the individuals and countries themselves. For example, in recognition of the fact that large numbers of Filipinos migrate to Macau and Hong Kong for work, the Philippines government has engaged the two destination governments for the benefit of all parties. The Philippines government, in cooperation with the Philippines Red Cross Society, ensures not only visas and safe transport but also pre-departure orientation seminars for potential workers. In Hong Kong, the Philippines' consulate plays a role in negotiating standardized contracts for all Filipino domestic helpers, specifically with the goal of preventing abuse and wage theft.⁵⁸ The government of Macau has even allowed the Philippines Red Cross Society to set up a local chapter to provide welfare, crisis intervention, and other services to female Filipino domestic workers. This has been instrumental in protecting the rights of Filipinos working abroad while ensuring a positive economic relationship between the governments.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This review has highlighted the multitiered nature of the population displacement crisis in Africa. The vast majority of this displacement is a symptom of serious governance dysfunctions (some of which have evolved into armed conflict). If these governance weaknesses could be remedied or constrained, it would significantly reduce the scale of the displacement challenges on the continent and by extension the strains faced by the international community.

Deep-seated economic, demographic, and environmental factors are further contributing to the pressure on African households. This is fostering increased economic migration, most evident in the surge of migrants heading toward the African coast of the Mediterranean since the mid-2010s.

There is also a security element to the displacement crisis. This does not imply that displaced individuals are a threat themselves. Rather, the surge in people on the move has created an opportunity for criminal and violent extremist groups in the Sahel-Sahara to access a new revenue stream. The nexus between weak governance and militancy, therefore, is contributing to the exacerbation of both migration and violent extremism.

Given the multifaceted nature of the challenge, a multilayered series of diplomatic, security, migrant protection, and development policies is needed. Significant reductions in levels of displacement are possible in the near term with more assertive policy initiatives in the leading African countries of origin. Longer-term strategies will be needed to address the underlying structural drivers of migration. While often presented as an African problem, large-scale population movements are a transcontinental challenge. Corrective action will be needed in countries of origin, transit, and destination if the effects are to be mitigated. International actors will have vital roles to play at each juncture.

Assertive Diplomacy

1. Protracted conflicts are the key driver of displacement in Africa and require intensified regional and international engagement to bring them to closure. African and international actors intent on reversing the displacement crisis in Africa must recognize that conflict is the principal driver of human dislocation on the continent. Unless these external actors exert serious effort into ending conflict, much time, effort, and money will be misdirected to temporary solutions. The fact that all armed conflicts on the continent are internal points to the important role that governance and the lack of power-sharing play in Africa's displacement crisis. Reducing conflict as a driver of displacement, therefore, will require greater diplomatic engagement to incentivize negotiation and upholding political resolutions.

Most of Africa's armed internal conflicts are also protracted – averaging more than 11 years. This demonstrates that belligerents are often unable to resolve their differences on their own and require trusted external engagement. Conflicts that have been left to fester, such as Burundi, the DRC, and South Sudan, show that it is far costlier to allow these crises to expand than to intervene at an early stage.

Just six countries in conflict account for more than 75 percent of all refugees, asylum seekers, and conflict IDPs in Africa (South Sudan, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Nigeria). Consequently, bringing any of these conflicts to closure would go far toward resolving the continent's displacement crisis. In other words, the potential benefit from greater African and international diplomatic engagement and conflict resolution is hard to overstate. Unfortunately, too often the political will to uphold stated regional norms of governance and conflict resolution is lacking.

The African Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC) is an institutional mechanism for early warning and preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and recommending interventions where

necessary to promote peace, security, and stability. The AU, however, has failed to act decisively on past PSC recommendations, especially when the perpetrators of abuses include sitting governments. The failure of the AU and Regional Economic Communities to call out and enforce an end to the repressive tactics being employed has encouraged further intransigence.

When political will exists, African states have shown commendable commitment to supporting peacekeeping missions. There are about 74,000 African peacekeepers serving in AU and UN peacekeeping missions in 12 African states.⁵⁹ This roughly doubles the levels seen in 2010 and reflects a growing commitment of African political leaders to these collective security processes. These deployments are widely seen as having mitigated further deterioration of security in the countries in which they are deployed.

In certain contexts, however, the AU has failed to either negotiate a political resolution to an escalating crisis or muster the political will to deploy peacekeepers in the early stages of a conflict to minimize the fallout, even when a weak sitting government is responsible for the instability. Burundi and South Sudan are notable cases in this regard. Thus, while African conflicts are often seen to be intractable, in fact they often persist because of insufficient attention on the part of key regional and international actors. More proactive diplomacy backed up with the credible deployment of force can help change the trajectory of these conflicts.

2. Penalize repressive regimes. Governmental intimidation of citizens is another driver of displacement in Africa. Nine of the top 10 countries causing forced displacement in Africa are authoritarian. Economic migrants, furthermore, are indirectly affected by repressive governance and corruption through push factors such as the inability to find work, earn an education, or open their own businesses. Such population displacements, in effect, reflect citizens seeking refuge from their governments. Left

unchecked, the repression, disenfranchisement, and state-sanctioned political violence by these governments will continue to generate further displacement. This creates real economic, social, and political costs on transit and receiving countries. Effectively, these repressive governments are “exporting” the burden of their poor governance onto their neighbors and the international community.

While African conflicts are often seen to be intractable, in fact they often persist because of insufficient attention on the part of key regional and international actors.

Rather than solely focusing on the symptoms of this problem, a strategic solution to Africa's displacement and migration crisis will entail redirecting the political costs of these government policies back onto the precipitating actors themselves with the aim of pushing them to modify their behavior. Such diplomatic pressure, ideally championed by the AU and RECs, is in keeping with the stated principles of the Africa Charter for Democracy, Elections, and Governance. According to the Charter, signed by 46 African governments and ratified by 31, the state parties committed to upholding principles of democracy and respect for human rights on the continent. The Charter calls for the AU to sanction members that violate these principles.

Diplomatic engagement could begin with Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) consultations. The APRM was established to hold member countries mutually accountable to standards of good political, governance, and socioeconomic development. However, if a repressive government shows no inclination to modify its behavior, increasingly assertive diplomatic engagement should be adopted. Escalating measures of peer pressure could include condemnation, commissions of inquiry, and suspension from regional bodies. This

Hybrid Commissions of Inquiry: Models for Tackling Corruption and Impunity

With many African countries experiencing the crippling effects of corruption, two hybrid missions in Central America offer valuable lessons for tackling it. In its mandate to combat corruption and impunity, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) combined the efforts of the UN and the Guatemalan government, while the Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH) was a hybrid effort between the Organization of American States and the Honduran government. Though both experienced setbacks and faced difficult challenges, the CICIG and MACCIH contributed to institutional strengthening. The CICIG even managed to expose corrupt networks that included top state officials and party leaders, including three presidents.⁶⁰

can then be expanded to asset freezes and travel bans for leaders of the responsible countries, as well as restricting elites' access to the international financial system.

Absent other resolutions, RECs should also consider a form of "displacement tax" on those governments most responsible for the largest displacements (such as South Sudan, the DRC, Sudan, CAR, Cameroon, Eritrea, and Burundi). RECs already charge their member states dues. Given that it is the neighbors of these governments that are incurring much of the costs of this misgovernance, RECs would be justified in charging the responsible governments an additional fee for the burden created. In practice, this may take the form of privileges, access, or status, rather than actual financial or in-kind payments. Nonetheless, this approach would at least be more coherent than the moral hazard inherent in the current reality where international actors are effectively rewarding those governments that cause the most displacement with additional financial assistance.

Toward that end, international actors should avoid making financial commitments to unaccountable autocratic governments and non-statutory militias in countries of origin and transit. Such funds have little likelihood of being used to create productive assets

that will entice people to stay. Rather, these funds will most likely be reinvested into the tools sustaining the political economies of autocratic regimes—state militarization, political repression, and patronage—as historically seen in the DRC, Libya, South Sudan, and Sudan. In other words, such fund transfers arguably only exacerbate the conditions that cause the displacement and onward migration in the first place. Any funding assistance in countries of origin facing such a governance environment would be better directed to those nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and subnational governments that have demonstrated a commitment to investing in their people and vulnerable newcomers.

Security Initiatives

3. Minimize violent extremist groups' access to financial flows generated by irregular migrants. Migrant smuggling and trafficking in the Sahel-Saharan belt has added another fount of income for non-statutory militias and violent extremist organizations. These revenues need to be brought into the security equation in order to address the escalating violence and acts of terrorism. Greater sustained intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance investments can help detect and disrupt these groups' control and taxation of trade and smuggling routes.

Continued effort is also needed to prevent cash from flowing internationally into the coffers of illicit actors and violent extremists. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as well as bilateral initiatives have been involved in monitoring and engaging African countries in identifying areas of risk and countering money laundering and terrorist financing, including through informal funds transfer systems, such as hawala.⁶¹ Through these engagements, international actors have helped African partners reduce the destabilizing effects of illicit flows on their

financial systems. For the majority of countries experiencing migrant smuggling, however, formal financial institutions for individuals to transfer funds are lacking outside of their capitals. Expanding the accessibility and reliability of such retail-level financial networks should be a priority.

Establishing sustainable government control across key transit areas also requires rebuilding trust with peripheral communities. Greater security and reliability for these routes will generate an economic boost on its own, facilitating job creation. Moreover, expanding opportunities for these communities to earn a living from licit goods and services will create ongoing incentives for government-community cooperation. Simply cutting off illicit activity without promoting alternatives will be of limited value to communities vulnerable to poverty, high unemployment, and recruitment by militant groups.

This multipronged approach will have the benefit of both weakening the capacity of these groups to profit off of smuggling and trafficking of humans and contraband as well as strengthening the financial systems of countries most at risk of exploitation by armed groups and violent extremists.

Protection of Asylum Seekers and Migrants

4. Sponsor the opening of consulates dedicated to asylum screening in countries of origin and transit. Just as the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees (CPA) deterred asylum seekers away from dangerous sea crossings by offering in-country asylum screening, so too could a similar program set up in the primary countries of origin and transit reduce the number of asylum seekers attempting to make the perilous journey along Africa's three main migration routes. If granted asylum, a refugee would be provided with the proper documentation and resources

to facilitate legal and safe travel. If not granted asylum, migrants could be warned of the dangers they face and informed of safer, legal avenues of migration such as applying for work or education visas in the desired destination country or alternative safe countries. In either case, providing individuals with real-time knowledge about risks and about legal and safe opportunities available to them would help asylum seekers and migrants alike make better informed decisions.

Establishing consulates from destination countries in well-known transit hubs closer to countries of origin could provide those with legitimate asylum claims an alternative to the treacherous and expensive journey to North Africa and across the Mediterranean. For example, in 2018, France set up a consular office in a migration hub in Niger to screen the 2,000 asylum seekers who had been evacuated by IOM from Libya to Niger.⁶² While France and a handful of other countries resettled some refugees identified by UNHCR, more comprehensive strategies are needed for the success of such programs. Those not accepted for resettlement remain in UN guesthouses in Niger. Another 50,000 asylum seekers and refugees identified and registered with UNHCR remain in Libya. Moreover, there are still hundreds of thousands of people in Libya facing exploitation and abuse who have not been identified by UNHCR.

Nonetheless, the establishment of consulates and efficient processing of asylum applications along migration hubs in Niger and other countries of origin and transit can save more lives by preventing individuals from embarking on or continuing potentially fruitless and dangerous journeys. The goal is to create opportunities for migrants and asylum seekers to have access to government officials with the authority to grant asylum as well as provide realistic, real-time information about alternatives. IOM indicates that its public education campaigns have deterred an estimated 55 percent of migrants it reached in Niger from continuing their journeys to the

Mediterranean. This also diminishes the smuggling fees and ill-gotten gains from exploitation that will go into the hands of criminal and violent extremist groups.

5. *Institutionalize regularized migration.* In certain cases, migration can address fluctuating labor shortages. This informal daily and seasonal migration already happens in many places throughout Africa without incident. For longer-term migrants, something as simple as having a basic identification card from their country of origin would provide a modicum of legal status and thus protection. By engaging key stakeholders (e.g., private sector, diaspora groups, civil society, and development partners) a more systematic process can be put in place to create regularized migration corridors for longer-term laborers travelling between destination and origin countries.

A model is the system pursued by the Philippines government on behalf of its citizens working in Hong Kong and Macau. The result has been an instrumental step in the protection of Filipino migrant workers' rights and ensuring a positive economic relationship between the countries. Creating regularized means for migration will help shrink the illicit economy and make it easier for the security sector to focus on trafficking networks and violent extremists.

6. *Step up harmonization of national asylum and migration policies as outlined in the AU's Migration Policy Framework for Africa.* The AU's Africa Refugee Convention (1969), Migration Policy Framework for Africa (2006), and Kampala Convention for IDPs (2009) provide legal recognition for all displaced Africans regardless of the driver of their mobility. These conventions cover a comprehensive array of related issues: labor migration, irregular migration, forced displacement, internal migration, the collection of migration data, border management, migration and development, and interstate and interregional cooperation. However, the principles and guidelines embodied in these conventions are often not applied in practice. A priority for AU member states and the RECs, therefore,

is to develop country- and region-specific policies that operationalize a unified approach regarding the movement of citizens within their respective regions in order to maximize economic, social, and stability benefits.

As the AU facilitates expanded continental economic integration—such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)—the region must also accommodate the movement of labor to regions of higher economic growth. Otherwise, irregular migrants will continue to be a lightning rod for social tensions and political instability.

In the same way, African governments should accelerate efforts to harmonize their immigration laws—including developing systems that facilitate an orderly, transparent, and legal border crossing process. Such an institutionalized process would reduce opportunities for the exploitation of economic migrants and forcibly displaced populations. Most importantly, it would diminish demand for smugglers.

While some measures will necessarily take some time to implement, immediate changes can be made. As championed by Uganda, South Africa, and Ethiopia, AU member states should work to allow asylum seekers freedom of movement, the right to work, and the right to education while they are seeking refuge. Experience shows that this policy not only provides refugees greater flexibility in identifying their own solution, it helps host communities by spurring economic involvement and investment from the refugees themselves.

Likewise, instead of fining or jailing migrants who do not have the proper documentation, authorities should assist with their obtaining proper documentation or, if necessary, their repatriation. The challenge will not be designing legislation itself, as many good examples already exist, but rather ensuring it is enforced equitably and does not become an opportunity for corruption, bribery, or discrimination.

7. Invest in data collection to facilitate harmonization and policy making. African countries of origin and transit do not always monitor the traffic of people crossing their borders. As a result, there is very little data upon which individual countries, regional bodies, and international actors can make reasoned and effective policy.

Participation in the collection of migration data is useful not only for the purpose of identifying vulnerable populations and budgeting for assistance, but also for urban and commercial planning, among other important local and national governance tools.

To help address the capacity and resource gap contributing to this lack of data, IOM has introduced a migration data analysis tool in 16 African countries. The MIDAS system collects information and biometric data of migrants to provide, among other information, evidence-based migratory patterns of these countries' cross-border traffic. A universally accepted and affordable evidence gathering tool to enable the monitoring and assessment of population flows and their causes would greatly aid analysis and policymaking at the local, national, and international levels.

Genuine concerns regarding privacy and misuse of biometric data by repressive governments requires certain restrictions in adapting such tools more widely. Nonetheless, systematic efforts to track population movements can enable better regional coordination.

Expansion of Employment Opportunities

8. Invest in creating job opportunities in economic migrants' countries of origin. With Africa's population set to double by 2050, investments will be required to improve the productive capacity of African economies so they are capable of absorbing and benefiting from a growing workforce, expected to reach more than 1.1 billion by then. This will require strengthening public goods such as the quality of educational systems, power grids, roads, and

communications capabilities that will enhance productivity as well as Africa's global competitiveness in export-oriented manufacturing and agricultural production.

Expanding employment options will require strategic investments in economic migrants' countries of origin (especially in West and North Africa) as well as African destination countries (such as South Africa, Nigeria, and parts of North Africa).

By investing in development strategies that expand employment opportunities in these countries, international actors can better direct their limited assistance resources from treating the symptom to changing the conditions that are displacing so many Africans and causing them to migrate further afield in the first place.

With much of Africa's growth occurring in urban areas, greater attention to basic urban infrastructure like water, sanitation, and transportation will be vital to forestalling restiveness borne out of the despair of ever-expanding urban shantytowns.⁶³ Investing in girls will be especially important. Educated girls foster better development outcomes for entire communities. They also tend to be older at first marriage, which has the effect of lowering the birth rate, reducing population pressure over time.

Even with rapid urbanization, a majority of Africans continue to live in rural areas. In some cases, rural inhabitants represent 70-80 percent of the population. So job creation strategies must simultaneously invest in agriculture and rural services. Agriculture is a sector that can absorb large numbers of relatively unskilled workers. Research and training on improving the productivity of small-holder farming, strengthening property rights, and a systematic process for land reform will be important means to boosting job opportunities and adapting to the shifting environmental conditions in rural areas.

CONCLUSION

Record levels of forced displacement and migration in Africa affecting tens of millions of people are one of the defining challenges facing the continent. How these are addressed will shape Africa's development and security environment for the 21st century. This surge in population movements is not inevitable, however. Measures can be taken to mitigate the negative effects. The vast majority of this displacement originates from a select few African countries experiencing repressive governance and conflict. Targeting the drivers in these countries will require greater initiative from across the diplomatic, security, and private sectors—in Africa and among international partners. While structural challenges such as population growth and environmental change will require longer term solutions, much can be done to address the short- and medium-term issues by incentivizing better governance and giving higher regional and international priority to negotiating resolutions to ongoing internal conflicts causing the largest surge of displacement.

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